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Key findings
•	 There is demand for latrines even 
among poor households; a sanitation 
loan program offered by socially-oriented 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) helps to 
increase uptake of sanitation among the 
poor. A small loan size and a poor-
inclusive application process are 
essential to success.
• MFIs can increase the number of loans 
offered, reduce loan processing time, 
and increase a household’s likelihood 
of committing to a sanitation loan 
by dedicating	loan	officers	to	the	
sanitation portfolio.
•	 Allowing borrowers to repay loans 
close to where they live increases 
the likelihood of interest in this loan 
product. Borrowers will hesitate if they 
have to travel long distances, especially 
for small loans.
• A close partnership between an MFI and 
a latrine business that has the motivation 
and capability to produce and 
deliver on time is needed to maximize 
commitments from customers and avoid 
losing latrine orders.
• A poor inclusive sanitation loan program 
is financially	viable	and	sustainable	
given the right support, and if loans are 
managed carefully.
INTRODUCTION
From 2000 to 2012, access to sani-
tation in Cambodia’s rural areas in-
creased by only 1% per year (JMP, 
2014). By 2012, 75% of rural Cam-
bodians lacked access to improved 
sanitation, and 66% practiced open 
defecation. Though open defecation 
rates are highest among the poorest 
rural Cambodians at 86%, they are still 
quite high even among the richest at 
32% (CSES, 2011). Lack of access 
to sanitation imposes significant eco-
nomic and social costs on rural Cam-
bodians, from higher child mortality 
due to diarrhea, other fecal-borne dis-
eases, to stunted growth of children. 
The World Bank’s Water and Sanita-
tion Program (WSP) is supporting the 
Government of Cambodia in its efforts 
to increase access to sanitation among 
rural households. Achieving this goal 
requires effective demand generation 
for sanitation, highly-engaged local 
governments that work closely with 
the private sector to encourage service 
delivery, and a well-functioning value 
chain that leverages the capabilities 
of domestic sanitation businesses as 
well as providers of sanitation financing 
products and services. 
In Cambodia, extensive previous ex-
perience with sanitation marketing 
approaches illustrates there is strong 
household demand for sanitation and 
the domestic sanitation market is ca-
pable of meeting it. At the same time, 
challenges remain in reaching low-in-
come households that do not have the 
cash to meet upfront payments to pur-
chase sanitation products. 
Over a 13-month period, WSP worked 
with a number of partners, including the 
international non-profit Program for Ap-
propriate Technology in Health (PATH) 
and International Development Enter-
prises (iDE), to pilot a sanitation financ-
ing program to address the challenge of 
reaching low-income households with 
improved sanitation solutions. This learn-
ing note presents the lessons from this 
pilot to promote scale-up in Cambodia 
and to inform similar efforts in other coun-
tries. This pilot is also part of a broader 
sanitation marketing initiative co-funded 
by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
and Stone Family Foundation.
Lessons learned from introducing microfinance loans  
for sanitation in rural Cambodia
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PROBLEM STATEMENT
While there is strong demand for improved latrines in Cambo-
dia amongst the rural poor, this demand goes unmet largely 
because these consumers cannot afford to pay upfront for a 
latrine that meets their preferences. Research showed that 
77% of Cambodians were considering constructing a latrine, 
yet ownership remains low, especially in rural areas.1 Ninety-
five percent of households who do not own a latrine reported 
they were too expensive or they did not have enough money 
to purchase a latrine upfront. Having access to microloans 
could help alleviate this challenge; however, microfinance in-
stitutions (MFIs) often perceive non-productive loans as high-
risk, particularly when the borrower is not a trusted existing 
business client. Yet, if a household with an income at the na-
tional poverty level (US$900 per household per year) could 
save just 5% of its income, it would have enough money in 
one year to buy a basic substructure of a latrine that is avail-
able in the market at the price of around US$40-45. In other 
words, if paying for the cost of a latrine can be spread out 
over a period of time, getting a latrine is becoming more af-
fordable for more households, possibly including the cash-
strapped poor for whom large upfront payments are prob-
lematic. It is important to note that the latrine product at the 
price given above only refers to the substructure part of the 
latrine (installation not included). Households then choose to 
build a shelter at their own additional cost, pace and accord-
ing to their preference, which could be made of  local organic 
materials, bricks or other materials.
ACTION
As part of WSP’s support to the Government of Cambodia 
to increase access to sanitation, especially among the 
poor, consultations with MFIs, NGOs, and other potential 
stakeholders were conducted to evaluate several sanitation 
financing options including savings groups, revolving funds, 
and latrine suppliers extending installment payments to 
their customers. While any of these approaches could be 
viable under the appropriate market conditions, the research 
concluded that savings groups relied too heavily on donor 
support and installment payments offered by latrine businesses 
were too complicated for businesses to manage. A household 
loan product offered through an MFI was determined the 
most scalable and sustainable approach in Cambodia. WSP 
and partners (PATH and iDE) sought to partner with MFIs with 
established scale and penetration in rural areas, a commitment 
to serving poor Cambodians, and an interest in participating in 
a pilot. Through this process, VisionFund Cambodia in Kandal 
province (Jul 2012 – Mar 2013) and KREDIT in Prey Veng 
province (Nov 2012 – Jul 2013) were engaged in the pilot.
KREDIT was chosen in part because of its strong existing so-
cial loan2 program targeted at the poor. As of 2011, KREDIT 
served over 56,500 clients. It had an operating self-sufficiency 
ratio of 123%, meaning that the organization’s operating ex-
penses were covered by their operational revenue. In addi-
tion, less than 0.33% of its loan payments were more than 
30 days late.
VisionFund Cambodia was chosen partly because of its 
previous partnership with PATH, and also because it has a 
low average loan size and one of the largest outreach into 
rural areas among MFIs in Cambodia. As of 2011, it served 
more than 132,000 clients, had an operating self-sufficiency 
ratio of 119% and less than 0.14% of its loan payments were 
more than 30 days late. 
The partnership was reflected in a scope of work outlining 
the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder: the MFI 
and its credit officers, PATH and iDE, latrine businesses and 
latrine sales agents. Because the primary goal of the pilot 
was to learn what approaches would increase latrine up-
take among the poor, the scope of work defined how proj-
ect partners would provide assistance to the MFIs so they 
could test different approaches and document the results. 
For example, one MFI received a grant to help offset the 
cost of collecting data for the pilot. Another received a loan 
guarantee to enable reduction in collateral requirements to 
ensure sufficient loan demand.
1 WSP, “Sanitation Marketing Lessons from Cambodia: A Market-Based Approach to Delivering Sanitation” Oct 2012.
2 For the purposes of this paper, the term “social loan” means a loan designed to improve the living standards of the borrower.
Table 1: Key MFI Metrics
Metric KREDIT VisionFund
Number of Provinces 11 19
Active borrowers 56,519 132,036
Total Loans Outstanding (US$) 44 million 38 million
Average Loan Size (US$) 789 286
Source: MFI 2011 annual reports
Domestic Private Sector Participation Making Toilets More Affordable for the Poor through Microfinance 3
www.wsp.org
KREDIT offered both group and individual loans to 
customers
KREDIT enabled villagers to decide whether they wanted to 
join a group or obtain an individual loan. Some villagers chose 
an individual loan because they did not want to find others to 
form a group or did not want to share default risk.
Under the community bank model, KREDIT offered loans to 
groups of 4-6 households and required at least two groups 
in order to establish a community bank. In three Prey Veng 
districts, group loans could be repaid locally. Group loan siz-
es ranged between US$40 and US$250 at an interest rate of 
2.9% per month.3 The group of households shared default risk 
as a collateral substitute and the community (group of groups) 
shared the risk of losing access to future loans in the event of 
default. Many of the borrowers under this program were exist-
ing customers and several new customers took out follow-on 
loans, so risk of losing access to future loans was a serious 
consequence of default. KREDIT required a balloon repayment 
method for all group loans. Under a balloon repayment, the 
entire principal is not amortized over the life of the loan, leaving 
a large balance at the end of the loan term that must be repaid 
in a lump sum. Balloon repayments are mostly popular with 
farmers or other households with seasonal income, as they can 
time the lump-sum payment with their income.
In a fourth district, KREDIT also offered loans to individuals 
between US$40 and US$250. Initially, individual loans were 
offered at an interest rate of 2.65% per month and individuals 
were required to travel to make payments at the MFI branch 
located in the district centers. The MFI also planned to re-
quire movable collateral (e.g., motorbikes, hand tractors, wa-
ter pumps) but found this requirement difficult to implement. 
Thus, KREDIT ultimately decided to offer loans with no collat-
eral to test if this would stimulate loan demand. To offset the 
increased risk, the MFI increased the interest rate on individual 
loans to 3%, and ultimately changed to allow repayment at 
the village level. KREDIT required a declining balance repay-
ment method for all individual loans. Under a declining bal-
ance method, principal repayments are spread out over the 
duration of the loan and interest is only charged on the actual 
principal, rather than the initial amount borrowed.
3 All loans were disbursed in KHR during the pilot, but have been converted to US$ for this Learning Note at a rate of 4,000 KHR to US$1.
Table 2: Summary of MFI sanitation loan offerings characteristics
Characteristic KREDIT individual loans KREDIT group loans VisionFund Cambodia group loans
Basic Structure 1 household, 1 district 3-6 households, 3 districts
From 2 to numerous households, all 
districts
Collateral No collateral requirement
Each group shares default risk and 
group of groups shares risk of access 
to future loan opportunities
Each group shares default risk
Repayment 
Location
Initially MFI branch office; changed to 
village based on demand through a 
village “teller” collecting payments
Village Village
Size
US$40-US$250 (Loans disbursed in 
KHR)
US$40-US$250 (Loans disbursed in 
KHR)
US$40-US$350 (loans disbursed in 
KHR)
Duration 6-12 months (borrower choice) 6-12 months (borrower choice) 4-12 months (borrower choice)
Repayment 
Method
Declining balance method Balloon method
Declining balance or balloon method 
(customer choice)
Interest Rate 2.65-3% per month 2.9% per month 2.6-2.8% per month
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VisionFund Cambodia offered group loans through a 
community bank model 
In VisionFund Cambodia’s community bank repayment method, 
the MFI offered group loans with a 2.6-2.8% interest rate per 
month. VisionFund Cambodia charged 2.6% for loans funded 
through Kiva4 and 2.8% for loans funded by other sources. 
Groups of households shared the risk of default. Customers 
could choose loan terms of 4-12 months as well as whether to 
use a declining balance or balloon payment method. Ninety per-
cent of customers chose to use the declining balance repayment 
method, underscoring the popularity of that payment method. 
Figure 1: Sanitation Loan Implementation Process
loan applications were approved, the latrine businesses, in 
the ideal scenario where the business was ready to deliver, 
distributed the latrines to households within a few days. Fol-
lowing confirmation that the latrines had been received, the 
MFIs disbursed loan payments to the latrine businesses once 
per week. In order to make this process work smoothly, PATH 
field staff provided considerable coordination support. 
It should be noted that some households might not imme-
diately install the complete latrine after the purchase of the 
basic substructure. Monitoring data suggest that within 6-12 
months around three quarter of all households have installed 
their toilet. In the pilot, there was no specific data collected on 
installation rates and shelter types for households that took 
up a sanitation loan.
LESSONS LEARNED
Lesson 1: There is demand for latrines even among 
poor households. A sanitation loan program helps to 
increase uptake among the poor.
Because many households, especially those with lower income 
levels, cite an inability to pay the up-front costs of a latrine as 
a major barrier to accessing improved sanitation, purchasing a 
latrine on credit may help increase sanitation uptake rates. 
For VisionFund Cambodia, the sanitation loans reached 
three times more poor households than their normal loans.5 
For KREDIT, the proportion of the sanitation loan taken up 
by poor households has been proportionate to poor popula-
tion in the province.6 In other words, the loan pilot was poor-
inclusive and better able to serve the poorer segments of the 
communities than their traditional loans. As most of the loans 
issued were group loans not requiring collateral, this mecha-
nism proved to be generally poor-inclusive. 
The findings of the pilot are consistent with research show-
ing that latrine uptake rates increased fourfold among poor 
households comparing cash on delivery and six-month 
spread payments.7
4 Kiva is a non-profit organization that through leveraging the internet provides no-interest funds to its worldwide network of microfinance institutions. For more information see 
www.kiva.org.
5 This is based on PPI USAID poverty tool which is used by VisionFund Cambodia to assess its borrowers. From all VF sanitation loans, 53% were disbursed to households living on 
PPI USAID Poverty Line, and 21% to those living under the PPI USAID Extreme Poverty Line. See also http://www.progressoutofpoverty.org.
6 For KREDIT, 32% of all sanitation loans were disbursed to poor households, as compared to an overall average of 27% poor households in the province. Poor households are 
defined as ID-poor category I and category II as per the official poverty identification system of the Cambodian government. See also http://www.mop.gov.kh.
7 IDinsight, “Microfinance Loans  to Increase Sanitary Latrine Sales,” Policy Brief, June 2013.
Latrines sold and distributed directly to groups and 
individuals
Latrines (excluding the shelter) were sourced from indepen-
dent latrine businesses, which hired commission-based sales 
agents responsible for selling latrines to groups of households 
within a given area. MFI field loan officers also attended these 
meetings to offer households the option to purchase latrines 
on credit. Sales orders and loan applications were completed 
at the end of these sales meetings (see Figure 1). Once the 
Latrine business produce latrines and build up stockLatrine businesses produce latrines and build up stock
Sales agents of the latrine businesses sell latrines to households through 
a group sales method
MFI ﬁeld loan ofﬁcers attend group sales meeting to offer credit 
to households for latrine purchases
Sales orders and immediate post-meeting loan applications are completed 
at the end of group sales 
MFIs perform normal loan review and approval process
Once approved, latrine businesses deliver latrines to households
MFIs disburse loans to latrine businesses upon conﬁrmation of 
latrine delivery to households
MFIs review monthly loan performance data and follow-up on late payments
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During the first half of the pilot, latrine cash orders exceeded 
latrine credit orders. However, as households became more 
comfortable with the idea of paying for a latrine with a loan, 
credit orders increased significantly (Figure 2). 
Lesson 2: Dedicated loan officers can streamline and 
expedite the loan process.
Households faced long delays while waiting for loan approv-
als, especially during the initial months of the pilot. Interviews 
with latrine producers and sales agents found that dedicat-
ed loan officers reduced the time households spent waiting, 
sometimes by as much as three weeks, thereby increasing 
loan volume and interest revenue for MFIs. Sales agents and 
latrine businesses expressed that they rely on strong relation-
ships with the loan officer for their own sales and revenue. As 
such, dedicated loan officers can make a sanitation loan pro-
gram more attractive for latrine businesses as well, improving 
the effectiveness of the program so long as latrine businesses 
are capable and ready to deliver latrines.
Interviews with sales agents indicate that customers are most 
motivated to buy a latrine after a group sales meeting, espe-
cially when they learn they can purchase the latrine on credit. 
Because rural poor households have many competing de-
mands on their time and resources, this motivation can dis-
sipate after a delay, reportedly often leading to a cancellation 
of a purchase. Thus, dedicated loan officers who process 
loans immediately after a sales meeting can have a significant 
impact on loan volume and interest revenue by minimizing 
delays. However, it is difficult for MFIs to support dedicated 
credit officers for a small loan program like this without ad-
ditional support from development partners. Therefore, the 
additional benefit of a dedicated credit officer needs to be 
weighed against the costs of human resources for MFIs. 
Lesson 3: Reducing loan processing times can 
increase sanitation uptake and may require removing 
regulatory barriers for loan approvals.
Giving loan officers the authority to approve loans imme-
diately is another way to reduce loan processing times. 
However, the Credit Bureau of Cambodia (CBC) requires a 
credit check for any loan. This step adds a delay to loan 
processing times, as credit checks can only be completed 
in an MFI’s district branch offices. It also increases an MFI’s 
operational costs as bank staff must travel between villages 
and offices to process credit check information. Further-
more, the CBC charges MFIs a US$0.18 fee for each credit 
check for a loan under US$500. For VisionFund Cambodia, 
the CBC credit check requirement added another layer of 
complexity as its loan approval procedure already required 
district branch managers to travel to the field to verify each 
household’s loan application.8
Obtaining a waiver for credit checks on small loans under 
a reasonable threshold (e.g., US$50, US$100) can facilitate 
faster loan processing, reduce the delay between the house-
hold’s decision to purchase a latrine and its delivery, and ulti-
mately increase sanitation uptake rates. 
Development partners and governments can support MFIs 
in developing strategies to overcome regulatory costs or bur-
dens like the CBC credit check requirement.
Lesson 4: Households may be willing to pay a slightly 
higher interest rate in exchange for a closer and more 
convenient payment location.
In the initial KREDIT individual loan design, borrowers were 
required to make repayments at district branches. However, 
very few people were willing or able to travel to the district 
capital (sometimes 25 km away) to do so. Thus, in April 2013, 
the KREDIT individual loan model was modified to a com-
munity bank model, where field “tellers” collected loan repay-
ments in each village. As a result, individual loan demand in-
creased, even though interest rates increased as well from 
2.65% to 3% per month. In fact, demand increased to such 
an extent that credit officers could no longer process loan ap-
plications in a timely manner. 
8 KREDIT’s operational procedure did not require an approval visit by the branch manager. KREDIT loans would be approved by the loan officer in the field, with the caveat that 
customers pass the CBC credit check that would be done afterwards in the district branch. Hence, for KREDIT the CBC credit check was less of an obstacle and not subject to a 
waiver in the pilot.
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Figure 2: Cash vs. Credit Latrine Orders in Prey Veng and Kandal 
Provinces
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Lesson 5: A close partnership between an MFI and a 
latrine business that has the motivation and capability 
to produce and deliver on time is needed to maximize 
commitments from customers and avoid losing orders. 
Selecting business partners with the desire and capability to 
deliver latrine products effectively is an important part of setting 
up a successful sanitation loan program. Ineffective business 
practices can be a risk to a loan program. For example, during 
the pilot, some sales agents offered latrines on credit to house-
holds that had not been approved as creditworthy by credit 
officers, leading to processing delays, lost or canceled orders, 
and general household frustration with the process. Additionally, 
because delivery is largely a fixed cost, a latrine business may 
wait to deliver latrines until volume has increased, maximizing 
the use of a single delivery trip. However, late delivery of latrines 
by a latrine business may cause households that have decided 
to purchase a latrine with cash to abandon the purchase deci-
sion. This is especially true during the initial months of a sanita-
tion loan program, when latrine order and delivery volume is low. 
In the pilot, the selection of the best latrine businesses was 
guided by i) the frequency of interaction between business-
es and sales agents, ii) the level of investment in production 
equipment, and iii) the training/coaching businesses would 
have received.
In the future, MFIs may consider developing detailed scopes of 
work with their business partners, drawing on learnings from 
the pilot to establish clear expectations of roles and responsibili-
ties. For example, MFIs may be able to align their incentives with 
those of latrine businesses by providing working capital loans to 
business owners who seek them.9 MFIs may also benefit from 
technical assistance from an external support organization that 
has experience in a sanitation loan program to understand the 
capabilities and constraints of potential latrine business part-
ners. These might include ability to access capital necessary to 
produce latrines and the ability to deliver latrines on time. 
Lesson 6: A poor-inclusive sanitation loan program 
has a relatively low risk profile and can be financially 
viable and sustainable given the right support. It can 
help socially-oriented MFIs widen their customer 
bases and achieve their missions.
Neither MFI experienced loan defaults nor delinquent pay-
ments over 30 days. Default rates under this pilot were lower 
than those for KREDIT and VisionFund Cambodia’s other 
loan portfolios. This could be because of the relatively low 
risk profile of small sanitation loans, and maybe also due 
to the methods used by MFIs to manage the loans. Both 
MFIs followed up promptly with households who were late 
on their payments. This may have reduced the rate of port-
folio at risk.
By the end of the pilot, both MFIs achieved loan self-sufficien-
cy ratios greater than 100%, indicating that costs of offering 
sanitation loans can be covered by the loan interest revenue. 
Loan performance data indicate MFIs go through a learning 
curve in which loan self-sufficiency rates improve over time 
(Figure 3). Pilot data seem to suggest that MFIs with previ-
ous experience implementing and scaling up social loans may 
reach loan-self-sufficiency faster than those without. 
Similarly, average acquisition cost per loan, or the direct 
costs of sales meetings and the loan application and ap-
proval process, decreased and stabilized after peaking in 
the third month of the pilot. This indicates MFIs learned 
how to acquire loans more efficiently during the pilot (see 
Figure 4). 
Generally, larger loan sizes were associated with greater rev-
enue. MFI 1 provided a larger average loan size than MFI 2 
(US$70 vs. US$55, respectively). The average revenue per loan 
for MFI 1 was US$5.53 compared with US$4.89 in MFI 2.
Plateaus in loan self-sufficiency ratios, like that shown during 
months 4 and 5 in Figure 3 are explained by increases in sales 
meetings (at greater cost) before greater latrine sales and rev-
enue was realized. Both MFIs disbursed a greater number of 
loans each month until the final month of the pilot, which saw 
a taping off (see Figure 5).
9 Loans to latrine businesses were not processed under this pilot as they either did not need them or were not motivated enough to seek loans.
10 For reasons of confidentiality, the names of the MFIs are not disclosed when discussing business performance.
Table 3: MFI Total Revenue and Average Loan Size
Model Total # of loans Average loan size (principal)
Total interest 
revenue 
MFI 1 1,053 US$70.6010 US$5,822
MFI 2 941 US$55.03 US$4,606
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Both MFIs allowed existing and new clients to take out loans 
under the sanitation loan pilot, with each MFI waiving prohi-
bitions against clients maintaining more than one loan at a 
time as long as one of the loans was for sanitation. The MFIs 
reasoned that sanitation loans were small, so they did not 
pose the same over-indebtedness risk to borrowers. Existing 
clients made up only around 25% of each MFI’s total loan 
portfolio. 
Allowing new clients increases risk somewhat, but enables 
MFIs to broaden their customer base. VisionFund Cambodia 
and KREDIT were both able to convert about 15% of new cli-
ents to larger, income-producing loans by the end of the pilot. 
Though 15% retention rates are not considered very high by 
MFI standards, both MFIs were able to realize new revenue as 
a result of retaining clients. During the pilot period, the MFIs 
participating in the sanitation pilot were able to disburse ap-
proximately US$55,000 in 195 follow-on loans to new clients.
WHAT ELSE WE NEED TO KNOW
In addition to the lessons learned from this pilot, MFIs in part-
nership with other actors may wish to test further innovations 
in offering a sanitation loan program to better understand the 
impact on sanitation uptake on rural households. 
Are MFIs willing and interested in sustaining and scal-
ing-up a sanitation loan program without continuous 
external support?
Behind the success of the pilot is the continuous support 
provided to the MFIs offering the sanitation loan product 
to rural consumers. This  support, either in terms  of risk 
sharing or a small grant, has been essential for the MFI 
to cope with  emerging risks and to help them go through 
the learning curve while introducing the latrine loan in their 
lending portfolio. More learning is needed on the type and 
intensity of support that MFIs consequently need to sus-
tain and scale up to ultimately achieve a situation where 
the product is fully integrated in their operations without 
external support.
Should sanitation loan products also cover the cost of 
latrine shelters?
Many Cambodian households do not view a latrine as com-
plete without a concrete water basin and a surrounding shel-
ter. However, a latrine with this form of infrastructure costs 
between US$200 and US$300, over four times the size of the 
average sanitation loan provided under the pilot. 
A larger loan that could cover the cost of concrete water basins 
and latrine shelters would likely increase improved sanitation 
uptake while contributing to higher MFI sales and interest rev-
enue. This hypothesis could be tested while introducing lower-
cost complete toilet options and the option of loan repayment, 
particularly amongst the poorest households. 
To what extent were the poorest households excluded 
from and affected by the sanitation loan program? 
Though the pilot sanitation loan programs increased sanitation 
access among the poor, qualitative research suggests some of 
the poorest households were excluded from group loans be-
cause these households were perceived as unable to repay 
the loan. More information is needed to determine the extent 
to which poor households were excluded from groups and the 
extent to which taking up a sanitation loan  affects the trade-
Figure 3: Average Weighted Loan Self Sufficiency Ratio for two 
MFIs
Figure 4: Average Acquisition Cost per Loan for two MFIs
Figure 5: Total New Loans Issued by two MFIs
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off in household spending patterns, as 
the  poor may not spend on other basic 
needs while paying off the loan. Such un-
derstanding will help identify other mea-
sures that can help them gain access to 
sanitation more effectively (e.g., savings, 
subsidies, loan guarantees). A complete 
toilet with shelter is a direction that may 
increase uptake of sanitation by house-
holds, and increase viability of sanitation 
loan programs. However, it will remain 
important to communicate behavior 
change messages to poor households 
to reinforce the social norm for stopping 
open defecation and position a toilet with 
a natural shelter as providing the benefits 
(such as privacy, convenience and no 
more shame) that households seek.
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CONCLUSION
Though many rural Cambodian house-
holds lack improved sanitation, there is 
considerable demand for latrines, es-
pecially when offered on credit. Small 
loans issued by MFIs to either individu-
als or groups of households can be a 
viable way to increase uptake of im-
proved sanitation in rural areas, includ-
ing among the poor. If such a program 
is planned, tested, and scaled up care-
fully, MFIs with good lender practices 
could reasonably expect low default 
rates and high loan self-sufficiency, 
while supporting their social mission. 
Sanitation loan programs are likely to be 
viable in other countries, though each 
area’s local context should be taken 
into consideration when structuring any 
replication of loan programs. For exam-
ple, in certain contexts, a strong local 
government could be a key partner and 
support sanitation uptake by offering 
loan guarantees or subsidies to enable 
poor households to pay for sanitation. 
Development partners can play a role 
in supporting sanitation loan programs 
by sharing lessons learned in the form 
of pilots and innovations, and resources 
such as the WASH microfinance tool-
kits created by Water.org and Micro-
Save.11 Development partners can also 
support MFIs in testing other innovative 
new lending approaches (e.g., though 
mobile banking) to understand the im-
pact that has on sanitation uptake.
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11 See for details http://www.microsave.net/resource/water_sanitation_and_hygiene_microfinance_toolkits.
Figure 6: While organic shelters are less 
desired than concrete alternatives, they 
are more affordable
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